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Abstract 
This study examines the effect of using a combination of narrative and statistical 
evidence on persuasion. Literature is divided on whether narrative or statistical evidence is more 
persuasive. There are a number of explanations to support both arguments, but arguing that one 
is superior may be flawed because these evidence types function differently and are not 
necessarily competitive. A few studies support the use of both narratives and statistics together, 
but none of these studies address the proportions when combining the two evidence types. This 
study fills the gap by creating messages with different degrees of anecdotal and statistical 
evidence. Conditions range from full anecdotal support to full statistical support and include 
three blended conditions (25/75, 50/50, 75/25). A total of 384 participants were surveyed via a 
national survey company. Results indicate that evidence type (narratives or statistics) and the 
various blends of evidence type do not change the persuasive effectiveness of a claim. While 
supporting persuasive claims with some kind of evidence is imperative, general populations do 
not favor one evidence type (narratives or statistics) over the other, and in fact, may be split in 
what they find more effective. Nor do people believe that evidence types function all that 
differently—at least when it comes to the support they provide for claims from livestock 
producers. Results, implications and recommendations for future research are discussed in detail. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Rationale 
The use of evidence to back up a claim increases the persuasive impact of a message 
(Cathcart, 1955; Reinard, 1988), and aids in source credibility (McCroskey, 1969). Of particular 
interest to scholars has been the persuasive effect of narrative and statistical evidence. The 
following table shows the varying results of these studies.  
 
Table 1.1 Previous Studies Findings 
NARRATIVES > STATISTICS 
Brosius (2000) 
Dickson (1982) 
Kahneman & Tversky (1972, 
1973) 
Kazoleas (1986, 1993) 
Morgan et al. (2002) 
Nisbett et al. (1976) 
Nisbett & Borgida (1975, 1977) 
Nisbett & Ross (1980) 
Reinard (1988) 
Sherer & Rogers (1984) 
Stitt & Nabi (2005) 
Taylor & Thompson (1982) 
 
STATISTICS > NARRATIVES 
Ah Yun & Massi (2000) 
Allen & Preiss (1997) 
Baesler & Burgoon (1994) 
Chaiken & Maheswaran (1994) 
Greene (2003) 
Hoeken (2001a, 2005) 
Hoeken and Hustinx (2006) 
Hornikx (2005, 2007, 2008) 
Reynolds & Reynolds (2002) 
Slater & Rouner (1996) 
 
NO CLEAR ADVANTAGE 
Baesler (1997) 
Cox & Cox (2001) 
Hoeken (2001b) 
Iyengar & Kinder (1987) 
Nadler (1983) 
 
 
Several studies have shown that narrative messages invoke stronger images and produce 
stronger emotional reactions, permitting the receiver to identify with the message.  As a result, 
narratives are viewed as more persuasive than statistical evidence (Bosius, 2000; Dickson, 1982; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; Kazoleas, 1986, 1993; Morgan, Cole Shuttmann & Piercy, 
2002; Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall & Reed, 1976; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; 
Reinard, 1988; Sherer & Rogers, 1984; Stitt & Nabi, 2005; Taylor & Thopmson, 1982). For 
example, Ah Yun and Massi (2001) found that narrative messages encouraging people to sign 
organ donor cards increased reactions of sympathy, happiness and perceived vividness in the 
recipients and as a result improved the persuasive ability of messages. 
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However, other studies have demonstrated that statistical evidence is more persuasive 
than narrative evidence (Ah Yun & Massi, 2000; Allen & Preiss, 1997; Baesler & Burgoon, 
1994; Chaiken & Mahewswarn, 1994; Green, 2003; Hoeken, 2001a, 2005; Hoeken & Hustinx, 
2006; Hornikx, 2005, 2007, 2008; Reynolds & Reynolds, 2002; Slater & Rouner, 1996).  These 
researchers argue statistics are more powerful because they provide a logical, rational reason for 
believability as they accurately represent the larger population. In turn, statistics create greater 
perceptions of message and source credibility, which results in greater message acceptance. For 
example, when Kopfman, Smith, Ah Yun, and Hodges (1998) compared reactions to organ 
donor messages they found participants exposed to statistical messages listed more total 
thoughts, both positive and negative, on an open-ended questionnaire following the message 
exposure compared to the narrative message group. This indicates the participants who received 
statistical evidence were more cognitively engaged in processing the message and even 
considered potential counter arguments. The participants also rated the statistical messages as 
more credible than the narratives. This may be due to the fact the use of statistics increases the 
verifiability of information (Ah Yun & Massi, 2000) and presents the reader with a larger (and 
perhaps representative) sample size (Baesler & Burgoon, 1994). These logically sound backings 
of statistical evidence may help build the message’s credibility as the receiver breaks the 
message down cognitively.  
 To complicate matters further, several studies argue the two evidence types are equally 
persuasive (Baesler, 1997; Cox & Cox, 2001; Hoeken, 2001b; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Nadlar, 
1983). Studies by Cox and Cox (2001) and Hoeken (2001b) suggest that anecdotal evidence can 
be as persuasive as statistical evidence when working to prove a specific claim (i.e., adding 
streetlights in a particular town) and when the anecdotal situation is seen as sufficiently similar 
to the question at hand. However, statistical evidence performs better when supporting a general 
claim. Yet, even when found equally persuasive, participants rate narrative and statistical 
evidence differently on elements such as “personalness” and “scientificness” (Baesler, 1997).   
The studies previously referenced treated anecdotal and narrative evidence as mutually 
exclusive. However, these evidence types are argued to serve different reactive functions. 
Assuming that messages rely on using one evidence type instead of the other is faulty. 
Fortunately, these evidence types may not need to solely be compared—or even compete for 
effectiveness.  Rather, the evidence types could be combined, as Allen and Preiss note, “It should 
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be pointed out that the use of narrative and statistical evidence is not exclusive, a communicator 
could use both” (1997, p. 126, italics mine).  It is this combination that is advocated by Reynolds 
and Reynolds (2002) when they state, “for now, the best conclusion may be that the effective 
advocate is best advised to use both statistical and narrative evidence” (p. 431, italics mine). 
This approach may increase the persuasive potential as combination messages may access 
persuasive benefits of both evidence types. However, there is a shortage of research examining 
the effect of combining evidence types. 
While some researchers recognize the need for blending the two evidence types (Allen & 
Preiss, 1997; Kreuter, 2007; Kopfman et al., 1998), only a couple studies have looked closely 
into this possibility. Allen, Bruflat, Fucilla, Krame, McKellips, Ryan, and Spiegelhoff (2000) 
found that a combination of narrative and statistical evidence was more effective than just 
narrative evidence or just statistics. Hornikx and Houët (2009) also found a combination of 
narratives and statistics to be more persuasive than narratives alone. Still, more research is 
needed looking into evidence types. More specifically, examining varying blends of narrative 
and statistical evidence could help pinpoint a place of maximum persuasion.  
Persuasion is a necessary component of relational success, especially in free market 
enterprises. This study is important because the ability to effectively construct a message using 
evidence is key to maximizing persuasion. This study expands on the idea of simply combining 
evidence types by exploring the degree to which each type should be used to create 
narrative/statistic evidence blends to back up messages. Different levels of evidence types can be 
expressed as balancing ratios blending narrative and statistical evidence. The implication of 
appropriate blends speaks to Reynolds and Reynolds’ concern that “advocates are also 
constantly confronted with balancing between detailed accounts of exacting scientific 
experiments and trying to group the data in the experiences of the audience” (p. 436, italics 
mine). Moreover, business professionals will benefit from the guidance of solid persuasion 
research on how to effectively balance evidence to maximize persuasion.  
Additionally, “research focusing on the underlying qualities or analysis that examines 
what evidence does in the mind of the message receiver offers some substantial methods of 
improving the understanding of why such effects occur” (Allen et al., 2000, p. 335, italics mine). 
Establishing whether or not the two evidence types have differences in the underlying qualities 
of narrative involvement and credibility gets at this concern. Finally, determining whether 
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statistics and narrative are more persuasive together or alone provides crucial information for 
those working to figure out how the different evidence types interact.  
Thus the following questions emerge. Is some combination of narrative and statistic 
evidence more persuasive than messages supported by just one of the two evidence types? 
Additionally, how do different levels of narrative and statistical evidence alter the cognitive 
reaction of credibility and the affective reaction of narrative involvement?  
 5 
  
CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review  
For the purpose of this thesis, evidence refers to “data (facts or opinions) presented as 
proof for an assertion” (Reynolds & Reynolds, 2002, p. 429, italics mine). Rieke and Sillars 
(1984) suggest evidence can be broken down into different groupings, including the categories of 
specific instances and statistics. Specific instances include “giving of examples and illustrations” 
(p. 92). This type of evidence is also referred to as “narrative evidence” (Allen & Preiss, 1997; 
Reynolds & Reynolds, 2002), “story evidence” (Baesler & Burgoon, 1994), and “anecdotal 
evidence” (Hoeken, 2001a; Koballa, 1986). Rieke and Sillars (1984) define statistics as “a 
numerical compacting of specific instances” (1984, p. 94, italics mine). Many authors also use 
the term statistics when referring to this evidence type (Allen & Preiss, 1997; Baesler & 
Burgoon, 1994; Hoeken, 2001; Reynolds & Reynolds, 2002). 
Case Context:  
Different types of evidence present opportunities not only to supply the receiver with 
information backing up a belief in a position, but also allow the recipient to emotionally interact 
with the advocacy. The fact that evidence persuades a target audience by influencing beliefs is 
well supported (Kruglanski & Stroebe, 2005). Additionally, numerous studies suggest the 
emotional effects created by evidence also persuade (Clore & Schnall, 2005).  A study of 
evidence blends affords us an opportunity to combine these persuasive effects.  
Theoretical Framework:  The Use of Narrative and Statistical Evidence 
As noted, narratives and statistics function differently in persuasion. Kopfman et al. 
(1998) examined different reactions to narrative and statistical evidence used in supporting 
claims about organ donation. They found the statistical evidence generated more total issue-
relevant thoughts, both positive and negative, when participants were asked after the stimulus to 
complete an open-ended measure listing their thoughts and feelings. Listing more thoughts and 
thoughts on multiple sides of the argument indicates the statistical evidence group engaged in 
more active cognitive processing considering the benefits and harms of the information 
presented. Additionally, the statistical evidence group ranked the message higher in 
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appropriateness, reliability, knowledgeability, credibility and thoroughness than the narrative 
evidence group did. 
 Alternatively, the group receiving the narrative evidence reported increased total affect 
or a greater number of emotions. Thus, Kopfman et al. (1998) concluded that statistics produce 
more cognitive reactions while narratives produce more affective reactions.  They note, “While 
evidence suggests that both statistical evidence messages and narratives can be persuasive in 
general and in the domain of organ donation research, previous research has not examined why 
both of the types of evidence can be persuasive or the reactions they typically engender” (p 295, 
italics mine). They also suggest the need to test the interactive affect of combinations of 
narratives and statistics.  
Other scholars agree that narratives and statistics perform different roles in persuasion. In 
attempt to explore some of the characteristics that make these evidence types unique, Baesler 
(1997) included the exploratory variables of personalness and scientificness of evidence in his 
study comparing narratives and statistics.  He suggests, “Personalness and scientificness of 
evidence … are characteristics unique to a particular type of evidence” (Baesler, 1997, italics 
mine). Indeed, results showed that messages with narrative evidence ranked higher in 
personalness, indicating greater reader connection to the message. Statistical evidence was rated 
higher than narratives in scientificness, often a measure of rigor, and an indicator that could lead 
to increased perceptions of credibility.  
Greene and Brinn (2003) found narratives and statistics functioned differently when used 
to support messages about the dangers of indoor tanning. Narratively supported messages 
increased perceptions of realism, indicating the recipients were connecting with these messages 
realizing the harms could also happen to them. Conversely, statistical evidence ranked higher 
than narrative evidence for information value, which suggests the statistical messages were 
perceived as more factual and credible.  
Similar to Kopfman et al. (1998), these findings indicate fundamental differences 
between narratives and statistics.  Specifically, narratives are superior to statistics in producing 
affective reactions and in particular building recipients feelings of narrative involvement with the 
message. Moreover, Baesler (1997) also contends “the content and structure of the story, with 
characters engaged in a dialogue, are inherently more personal than statistics” (p. 171, italics 
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mine). In each of these studies, the narrative message recipient perceived a greater emotional 
bond and even empathetic reaction towards the message.  
The vivid nature of narratives may be one reason people easily connect with them 
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980).  Baesler and Burgoon (1994) suggest, “it is generally accepted that 
stories are more concrete, more imagery provoking, and more colorful than statistics that are 
often abstract, dry, and pallid” (p. 585, italics mine).  Additionally, the visual may help create a 
causal link as it is presumed to be more emotionally interesting (Taylor &Thompson, 1982). 
Moreover, people are exposed to the story-telling structure at an early age and also use it in 
everyday life to communicate. For these reasons, familiarity may also increase the appeal of 
narrative evidence. Further support of the narrative involvement effect of narrative evidence 
comes from findings that narratives are much more persuasive in situations when the narrative 
provided is similar to the claim it supports (Hoeken & Hustinx, 1997).  It follows that the 
message recipient connects with the story more when it is similar to his or her own situation and 
this narrative involvement that results in increased persuasion.  
Statistics fulfill a different role. They generally increase cognitive effects and in 
particular, increase participant’s perception of the credibility of a message. “Statistics, by 
including numerical data based on some type of research, are often perceived as inherently more 
scientific than stories,” (Baesler, 1997, p. 170, italics mine). Statistical messages also produce 
more total thoughts, both positive and negative, than narrative messages (Kopfman et al, 1998). 
In other words, people process messages with statistical evidence more.  The recipient evaluates 
both the value of the argument and considers potential counter arguments. Additionally, 
statistical messages receive higher ratings of appropriateness, effectiveness, reliability, 
knowledgeability, credibility, and thoroughness than narrative messages (Kopfman et al., 1998).  
This indicates that some component of cognitively processing the statistical evidence leads to 
perceptions of greater credibility of the message. This may be a result of statistics increasing the 
verifiability of information (Ah Yun & Massi, 2000) and presenting the reader with an increased 
sample size (Baesler & Burgoon, 1994).  
Arguments can create both cognition and emotions, and it is the combination of these two 
things that optimizes our social judgment (Kaplan, 1991; Kaplan, 1981). In other words, both are 
competent sources of information that interact to create a particular social judgment. If so, then it 
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is extremely important to consider how they react with one another to create the ultimate 
judgment. Kaplan (1991) suggests: 
Social Judgments are affected by multiple determinants. Several cognitions and one or 
more affective states may jointly affect a single judgment Asking how affective and cognitive 
information are integrated leads to the interesting possibility that moods and emotions are 
processed differently, though both can still be considered as sources of information and thus 
posses weight and scale (p. 81).  
The difference in narratives and statistics is extended by Bruner’s (1986) view that 
evidence is paradigmatic and/or narrative. The paradigmatic way of knowing involves systematic 
logical reasoning.  This perspective lends itself to statistical evidence. Alternatively, the narrative 
shapes reality through focusing on action and detail rather than categorizing systematically. 
“Both paradigmatic and narrative ways of knowing are necessary to develop an understanding 
of the world, and each provides a distinctive way of ordering experiences and constructing 
reality. Neither is inherently more valid than the other” (Kreuter, 2007, p. 779, italics mine).  In 
this sense, Kreuter (2007) and Bruner (1986) argue that there are fundamental differences in the 
two main types of evidence as well as a possible need for an engaging compliment of the two 
evidence types.  
Evidence and Persuasion  
Over 2,000 years ago the Greek philosopher Aristotle argued that there were three basic 
ways to persuade an audience - ethos (the author’s character or image), logos (logical 
arguments), and pathos (the emotions of the audience) (Braet, 1992). Cathcart published the first 
academic article on persuasiveness of evidence in 1955. “An experimental study of the relative 
effectiveness of four methods of presenting evidence” involves a study in which Cathcart argues 
for capital punishment to several groups of students. The control group included no evidence. 
For the second speech, Cathcart supported 90 percent of his claims with evidence but did not 
mention sources. In the third speech, he gave sources by name only, and, in his forth speech, he 
included the sources as well as the sources’ qualifications. The last three speeches were reported 
to be significantly more persuasive than the first speech. This seminal finding suggested that 
evidence affects persuasion and this conclusion has been supported up by numerous studies since 
(see Reinard, 1988). Research also suggests that the mere existence of evidence is necessary but 
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not sufficient, and the quality of evidence is an important component of persuasion (Allen & 
Burrell, 1992). With this in mind, the qualities that differentiate narrative from statistical 
evidence may also create different outcomes, and more so, combining them (perhaps at different 
degrees) may create additional/different effects.    
The Case for the Persuasive Advantage of Narratives  
Numerous studies have found narrative evidence to be more persuasive than statistical 
evidence. Reinard’s (1988) review of research on the persuasive effects of evidence revealed 
significant support for narrative persuasiveness, especially in courtroom settings. Reinard (1988, 
p. 26, italics mine) remarks that while “statistics have been respected in Western culture almost 
as icons of objectivity,” his review of 50 years of research in the area found little evidence 
backing up a persuasive advantage for statistics.  
Nisbett et al. (1976) indicated that evidence has a different effect for different audience 
types. Specifically, they suggested evidence the scientific community finds compelling is not 
necessarily persuasive to a lay audience. “We believe that the present research and examples 
drawn from every-day life show that some kinds of information that the scientist regards as 
highly pertinent and logically compelling are habitually ignored by people. Other kinds of 
information, logically much weaker, trigger strong inferences and action tendencies” (p. 133, 
italics mine). Other kinds of information, such as specific instances and stories, can actually have 
a greater, often unexplained persuasive effect. This is especially true when the information is 
considered to be relevant to the situation under discussion.  
Studies finding narratives more persuasive than statistics point to reasons such as 
vividness, perceived representativeness, and ease of recall to explain this advantage. First, 
narratives are more vivid in nature, which may enhance their persuasive benefit. Nisbett and 
Ross (1980) discuss support for the persuasive effects of narratives over statistics and suggest 
this may be due to the inherently vivid nature of narratives. And although Taylor and Thompson 
(1982) found that in six out of seven studies, case history presentation (narratives) was more 
persuasive than statistics; they found little conclusive support for the vividness effect. Yet, other 
studies have found stronger support for a vividness effect. Sherer and Rogers (1984) found that 
anecdotal evidence was more effective than statistical evidence when supporting the claim that 
by drinking less people avoid certain dramatic consequences. This was especially true when the 
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anecdotes were more vivid. The anecdotal evidence told the story of two drinkers while the 
statistical evidence used numbers about 200 problem drinkers to back up the claim. 
This vivid nature of narratives is in close association with greater perceptions of 
representativeness than statistics. For example, people will call less probable events (flood in 
CA) more likely to occur than other events (flood in U.S.) if they are given details (due to an 
earthquake), which makes the events more available for them to imagine (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972). Nisbett and Borgida (1975) found that when given an extreme case (narrative) example 
people are just as likely to infer others behaved this way even when they know the behavior was 
atypical. They also found that people transfer the extreme behavior to entire populations when 
provided a sample of just a few people acting in that way. This lends support to Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1972, 1973) assertion that people fail to use available statistical breakdowns when 
predicting whether or not an individual is part of a group. They state that instead of breaking 
down information cognitively people sometimes rely on outside cues or heuristics to make 
decisions. In this case, the representative heuristic leads people to believe something is more 
representative than it actually is. Brosius (2000) explained that exemplars in the news are often 
more persuasive than statistics because they are more engaging and taken as more representative. 
Exemplars are short verbal or visual quotations used to demonstrate a situation and fall closely in 
line with the definition of a narrative.  
In 1982, Dickson conducted a study comparing the persuasiveness of anecdotal and 
statistical evidence in relation to the reliability of a certain brand of refrigerator. The anecdotal 
group received testimonials from four housewives who had no troubles with the refrigerator and 
one who experienced difficulties. The statistical group was told that 395 housewives reported no 
problem while 105 housewives had difficulties. Note both groups have a breakdown occurrence 
of around 20 percent. Yet, when the asked about breakdown rate, the statistical group reported 
close to the actual number (20 percent breakdowns) while those having heard the anecdotal 
report estimated a higher breakdown rate. Hoeken (2005) used this study to illustrate that 
statistical evidence is more persuasive because that group reported realistic numbers. However, 
this could easily be interpreted to the contrary. One housewife with difficulties created a larger 
persuasive effect. Individuals in that group perceived more (or a higher percentage) of difficulty 
than the statistical group. Although Dickinson might conclude that statistics provide more 
accurate recall of numeric distribution, it is a stretch to assume that accurately recalling a percent 
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is more persuasive. Thus, this study could be interpreted as the narrative of the one housewife 
being the most persuasive as it pulled participants away from the statistical breakdown rate to 
imagine her difficulties as more common than they actually were.  
Better recall, especially over a longer period of time, is another advantage of narrative 
over statistical evidence. Kazoleas (1993) found people who heard narratives were more likely to 
recall the information after a significant amount of time has passed and their attitude change was 
more persistent over time. While this study indicated that narrative evidence has an enduring 
effect, it showed no significant difference in initial persuasion between the anecdotal and 
statistical evidence. At the time of the initial survey, those hearing a story about how a seatbelt-
prevented injury reported the same attitude as those who heard the statistic that people are 50 
percent less likely to be injured when wearing a seat belt.  
Koballa (1986) found that anecdotes were more persuasive than statistical evidence when 
trying to persuade teachers to supplement traditional science curriculums with new programs. 
Anecdotes, in the form of a testimonial of a participant in the new program, resulted in higher 
initial attitude change, and the anecdotal evidence group’s attitude change was significantly more 
effective as time passed. As similarly noted later by Kazoleas (1993), anecdotes indeed create a 
sustained effect and allow for easier recall over time whereas statistics fade.  
These factors (increased vividness, increased perceptions of representativeness, and 
greater recall over time) could all be indicators of a larger function of narrative evidence - its 
ability to increase affective reactions in general and specifically the feelings of narrative 
involvement with the message. This feeling of narrative involvement with the message is often 
referred to as absorption or transportation. The attitude and behavior change created by 
persuasive pro-social messages in narrative television and radio programming is “attributed to 
audience members’ engagement with the characters of the show and absorption into the plot,” 
(Stitt & Nabi, 2005, p. 5, italics mine).  Furthermore, absorption into the plot of a narrative is 
defined by Slater and Rounder as “vicariously experiencing the characters’ emotions and 
personality,” (2002, p. 178, italics mine) and is shown to increase persuasion. The Stitt and Nabi 
(2005) study showed that narrative evidence increased transportation or absorption into the 
message. Additionally, absorption increased affective responses, reduced counterarguing (a sign 
of cognitive processing) and led to more story-consistent beliefs (indicating persuasion). The 
vividness of messages also likely enhances absorption into that message. Additionally, subjects 
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may exaggerate the representativeness of a narrative (e.g., Dickinson, 1982) and better recall 
narratives over a period of time because of the personal connection made (e.g., Kazoleas, 1993; 
Koballa, 1986).  
Narrative involvement helps explain the results of many studies favoring narrative 
persuasiveness over statistics. Morgan, Cole, Shuttman, and Piercy (2002) found evidence for 
narratives as more persuasive than statistics in safety messages when narratives included fear 
appeals. They suggest recipients identified more with the characters in the narratives than they 
did with non-personal statistics. Nisbett et al. (1976) noted that waiting lines for cancer screening 
skyrocketed when Mrs. Ford and Mrs. Rockefeller received mastectomies as people connected 
more with the personal cancer experiences of the two public figures than with doctors’ statistics 
about the risk of cancer.   
Borgodia and Nisbett (1977) found that students experienced little or no persuasion about 
a decision to take a course from a particular instructor based solely on statistical reports of the 
teacher’s evaluations. However, students who received face-to-face feedback from past students 
(anecdotes) increasingly based their decision to take a course from a particular instructor on 
those comments. This study has been criticized because different mediums were used for the two 
evidence types, however it clearly shows how a connection with another student can be more 
persuasive than detached statistics about student responses. 
In summation, narrative evidence is naturally more vivid. And this vividness likely 
enhances absorption into the message. Additionally, the vividness and absorption may also allow 
for subjects to exaggerate the representativeness of a narrative and better recall narratives over a 
period of time. Furthermore, narratives create more total affective reactions. Given the 
considerable benefits of narrative evidence, the following hypothesis is suggested:  
H1: Messages containing higher ratios of narrative evidence will be rated 
significantly higher in perceptions of narrative involvement with the message than 
messages containing higher ratios of statistical evidence. 
However, literature on the relative persuasiveness of narratives versus statistics is far 
from unanimous. In 1994, Baesler and Burgoon tested the effect of vivid story, non-vivid story, 
vivid statistical and non-vivid statistical evidence on belief change regarding juvenile 
delinquents becoming adult criminals. Attitude was measured at three different time periods – 
immediately, 48 hours later, and one week later. Story evidence (both types) was not persuasive 
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for either of the delayed periods (48 hours or a week later). However, both vivid and non-vivid 
statistical evidence was persuasive at 48 hours and this effect was extended to one week for the 
vivid statistical evidence. Although this suggests that statistical evidence is more persuasive over 
time than narratives when vividness is kept in constant, the authors note, “an issue unresolved in 
the persuasion and argumentation literature is the type of evidence that is most likely to bolster 
beliefs in a claim: statistical evidence or report evidence of a story or case variety” (p. 582, 
italics mine). Additionally, it is likely that this study is removed from real world situations, as 
narratives tend to be more inherently vivid. Still, many authors have argued more decisively that 
statistics are actually the more persuasive of the two evidence forms.  
The Case for the Persuasive Advantage of Statistics  
Notwithstanding the support for narrative evidence, statistical evidence is believed to be 
extremely persuasive because it provides a large sample size, bolsters perceptions of 
believability and credibility, and fairs better when supporting general claims.  
By definition, statistics represent a larger sample size of subjects than narratives. This 
often provides a logical reason for message recipients to prefer statistics. This effect is well 
supported in a number of studies. For example, Hoken (2001a) examined the persuasive 
difference between evidence types when trying to assure audiences about the likely success of a 
new cultural center. The anecdotal group reviewed a story about the success of a similar center in 
another town, whereas, the statistical group reviewed a report about the success of 27 different 
cultural centers. The statistical group reported higher levels of persuasion. Researchers attributed 
this to the increased confidence that occurs with providing 27 samples rather than just one.  
Increased believability (or credibility) is another factor cited for the persuasive advantage 
of statistics. Perceived source credibility has a positive impact on persuasion (Nan, 2007; 
Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kelman & Hovland, 1953: Warren, 1969). Source credibility is 
commonly defined as a message source’s ability or motivation to provide accurate and truthful 
information (Kelman & Hovland, 1953). In 1996, Slater and Rouner found statistical evidence 
more persuasive and suggested recipients perceive statistics as more likely to represent the truth 
and more believable in general. However, the results of their study were more nuanced than just 
increased believability with statistics. When subjects agreed with the message’s position, they 
rated statistical evidence as better written. However, statistical evidence had no effect when the 
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subjects opposed the position. Instead, subjects who disagreed with the message’s position rated 
the narrative evidence as more believable, more persuasive and slightly better written. While this 
study illustrates statistics as more persuasive on average, it also provides a great deal of support 
for the claim that evidence types function differently. Perhaps statistics are more believable when 
the audience is predisposed to agree with the position, but if the target is predisposed to disagree 
with the argument, narratives will be more persuasive. In this case, absorption may be interacting 
with positionality and limiting counterarguing, which would allow narratives to have the 
persuasive advantage.  
In 2008, Hornikx conducted a study where participants ranked four types of evidence 
(statistics, expert, causal, anecdotal) for their expected persuasiveness. Subjects reported they 
expected statistical evidence as the most persuasive. Expert evidence was rated as next in 
persuasiveness, then causal evidence, and lastly anecdotal evidence. Hornikx also found 
participant expectations of persuasive strength to be consistent with the persuasive effect of the 
relative evidence types. Aside from the fact this study suggests that people rate statistics as more 
credible, it also suggests that regardless of the message, subjects will report persuasive outcomes 
consistent to prior attitudes about evidence type. 
Credibility is directly related to the perception that statistics are higher in information 
value. In a study comparing statistics, narrative, and self-assessment to communicate about 
tanning being a risky behavior, the statistical evidence was reported higher on the value of 
information provided (Greene, 2003). The statistics condition also decreased participants’ 
intentions to tan and actual tanning behavior. Additionally, the statistics condition effectively 
increased thoughts of risk perceptions such as susceptibility to skin cancer. Although narrative 
evidence did not increase risk perceptions, it decreased intentions to tan and (unlike statistics) 
increased the perceptions of realism. This indicates that while both narratives and statistics are 
persuasive, statistics are more effective at changing risky behavior.  
As previously noted, statistics are also more effective with supporting general claims. 
Hoeken and Hustinx (2006) found that when the claim is general (i.e., people should quit 
smoking or drink less), statistical evidence was the most persuasive in convincing subjects to 
accept the claim. A general claim consists of a claim of a large number of unspecified entities. 
However, anecdotal evidence was suggested to be just as effective at convincing subjects to 
accept a claim if the claim was more specific (i.e., buy a Volkswagen Beetle) and if the situation 
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in the anecdote was considered to be sufficiently similar to the situation in the claim.  In 
instances when the anecdotal evidence was dissimilar to the situation, statistics were more 
persuasive, even when working to prove a highly specific claim. Statistics perform better when 
supporting a general claim because the receiver is not likely to connect (or need to connect) with 
the message emotionally. For example, if a particular claim will not affect them on a personal 
level.  
As noted, anecdotes are stronger when supporting specific claims (Hoeken & Hustinx, 
2006; Hornikx, 2007). Additionally, anecdotal evidence serves as a persuasive counter example 
to a general claim by suggesting that the claim may not be true all the time. In this sense, 
narratives serve as very effective support for a refutational claim. Hornikx (2007) recognizes the 
persuasiveness of anecdotes but insists statistics are more persuasive overall and in general. He 
explained the discrepancy between contradictory findings about the relative persuasiveness of 
statistical and anecdotal evidence was related to flaws in the methodological design of studies. 
To begin, Hornikx (2007) argues that several studies were designed to privilege 
anecdotes. For one, he suggests that ordering effects may have played a role as anecdotal 
evidence was often presented after statistical evidence, creating a potential recency effect (rather 
than a pure persuasive effect). In addition, he suggests that anecdotes often are more vivid than 
statistics in studies, and this affects survey recall (but may not suggest persuasive capability). 
Thirdly, he notes the anecdotes used in studies were often more causal in nature than the 
statistics (and casualness may impact receptiveness). Thus, they might have been chosen because 
they better explained why something occurred, not because they were anecdotal. Finally, classic 
studies often argued more specific claims rather than general ones –which have been shown to 
favor anecdotal evidence (e.g., Hoeken & Hustinx, 2006). Hornikx points to a study that 
examines the implementation of a comprehensive exam and its relationship to increased salaries. 
The specific claim suggests, “A comprehensive exam at a specific school will raise salaries.” 
And the more general one claims “Students who pass comprehensive tests will have higher 
average salaries.” The first claim (the specific claim) has been shown to favor anecdotal 
evidence. The second claim (the general claim) favors statistics. 
These explanations provide support for the 2005 review Hornikx produced for the 
relative persuasiveness of anecdotal, statistical, causal and expert evidence. This review 
examined fourteen studies on argument type and persuasiveness. After accounting for variances 
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due to differences in definitions and operationalisations, Hornikx argues statistical and causal 
evidence is more persuasive than anecdotes for reasons such as greater sample size and 
credibility.  
The comparison studies had to meet six criteria, including utilizing definitions consistent 
with Rieke and Sillars (1984). The results appear below. However, it should be noted that three 
studies (Dickson, 1982; Kazoleas, 1993; Sherer & Rogers, 1984) have been classified differently 
in this literature review than Hornikx classified them in his review. In these cases, the results of 
the studies were found to favor anecdotes over statistics despite Hornikx interpreting them as 
otherwise. 
Table 2.1 Hornikx's Classification of Previous Studies 
Result  Reference  
statistical> anecdotal Allen et al. (2000) 
Baesler & Burgoon (1994) 
Dickson (1982) 
Hoeken (2001a)  
Hoeken & Hustinx (2003)  
Slater & Rouner (1996)  
statistical = anecdotal Baesler (1997) 
Cox & Cox (2001)  
Hoeken (2001b)  
Kazoleas (1993)  
Sherer & Rogers (1984)  
anecdotal> statistical Koballa (1986)  
 
Allen and Preiss’ (1997) meta-analysis compared the persuasiveness of narratives and 
statistical evidence. Like Hornikx, their examination (of 15 studies) concluded that statistical 
data is more persuasive than anecdotal data. However, Allen and Preiss also suggest a 
combination of evidence types may ultimately be the most effective and recommend further 
research in the area. 
Hornikx (2007) also calls for additional research to compare the persuasive effect of 
statistical and anecdotal evidence when providing incongruent evidence (for example, anecdote 
says X and statistic says opposite of X) and while controlling for order and evidence vividness. It 
may be the case that narratives are inherently more vivid but since order has not been controlled, 
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it is necessary to test for this effect. Clearly, there are still some areas for further exploration in 
the area of evidence type and persuasiveness.  
However, research has argued that statistical evidence can be extremely persuasive, 
especially when supporting general claims. Additionally, statistical evidence performs well 
because it represents a larger number of instances than narratives. Furthermore, statistical 
evidence increases perceptions of valuable information as well as believability, both major 
components of credibility.  
Statistics lends itself to increased cognitive processing. Recognizing the value of a large 
sample size instead of inflating representativeness indicates more cognitive break down of the 
information. Reynolds and Reynolds (2002) argue that evidence must be recognized, cognitively 
processed, and judged as legitimate in order to maximize persuasion. They also call for more 
research on argument type affecting this process but conclude “on balance, statistical evidence 
would seem to be the more persuasive form of evidence when compared to narrative evidence” 
(p. 431, italics mine). 
Increased perception of credibility also points to cognitive processing. Source credibility 
is suggested to be a combination of the source’s perceived competence about a particular topic 
and the source’s perceived trustworthiness (Hovland & Weiss, 1951). Statistics increase the 
verifiability of information, which increases perceptions of credibility (Ah Yun & Massi, 2000). 
Additionally, research has shown that “the psychological mechanism through which perceived 
source credibility influences is complex and could involve an indirect effect via cognitions” 
(Nan, 2007, p. 8, italics mine). For example, Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) found that 
perceptions of source credibility affect cognition about a message, with more positive cognitions 
related to sources perceived to be more credible. Thus, given this reasoning, targets of a message 
will perceive the source using statistical evidence as potentially more credibility and therefore, 
hypothesis 2 follows: 
H2: Messages containing higher ratios of statistical evidence will be rated 
significantly higher participants’ perception of message credibility than messages 
containing higher ratios of narrative evidence. 
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To complicate matters further, and as some of the previous studies have alluded, a 
separate set of studies have found statistics and narrative to be equal in their persuasive effect 
(e.g., Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Nadler, 1983).   
No Clear Advantage 
In 1997, Baesler conducted a study in which no persuasive advantage was found for 
statistical or narrative evidence. In the study, 100 undergraduate students were given an attitude 
measure before and after reading three stories for submission into the newspaper. Half the group 
received three statistical-based stories and the other half received three narrative-based stories. 
Both evidence types were successful in creating opinion change in one of the three areas (a 
successful opinion change occurred with the crime story but did not occur with the internship or 
birth control stories). However, neither evidence type was shown to be more persuasive than the 
other with any statistical significance. Therefore supporting a set of claims about crime creates a 
greater likelihood of persuasion than supporting a set of claims about internships or birth control. 
Perhaps the real conclusion here is about the effect of topic type rather than evidence type. 
Baesler (1997) included the exploratory variables of personalness and scientificness in 
one evidence type study. He found that participants rated narratives high in personalness but low 
in scientificness. Surprisingly, statistics were rated as moderate in both areas. However, neither 
of these measures was related to persuasion with any statistic significance. Baesler (1997) also 
found there was no difference in unfavorable cognitive responses (i.e., counterarguing) between 
the two evidence types.  
Hoeken (2001b) conducted a study about raising taxes to install more streetlights on 
sidewalks. Results indicated the two evidence types were equally effective. Participants in the 
statistical group were told that in 48 other towns increasing streetlights reduced the number of 
burglaries by an average of 42 percent. The anecdotal group was told about a single town, 
perceived to be similar to their own, that added more streetlights and decreased burglaries by 42 
percent.  
Cox and Cox (2001) conducted a study in which no persuasive benefit was found for 
either evidence type. In the study, female participants were given information about the benefits 
of regular screening mammograms. In the statistical evidence, an early treatment was said to 
reduce the risk of dying from breast cancer by 30%. The anecdotal evidence was the story of a 
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woman who likely would have died if her breast cancer had not been caught early on in a 
mammogram screening. This study found statistical and anecdotal evidence to be equally 
persuasive.  
Baesler (1997), as well as Cox and Cox (2001) and Hoeken, (2001b) suggest that 
anecdotal evidence is as persuasive as statistics (and statistical evidence as persuasive as 
anecdotes). Although evidence types may differ in terms of the advantages they provide or 
functions they serve (e.g., personalness, scientificness, source credibility, information value, 
narrative involvement, etc.), there is certainly sufficient reason to suggest both evidence types 
are equally persuasive.      
Combining the Evidence Types 
The previously mentioned studies compare messages using one type of evidence 
(statistics) to those using another type of evidence (narratives/anecdotes). In most of these 
studies, they pit—and evaluate—evidence types against each other.  Yet, the use of evidence 
does not have to be (and often may not be) mutually exclusive. In fact, a communicator could 
easily utilize both narratives and statistics in the same message (Allen & Presiss, 1997).   
At present, few studies combine statistical and narrative evidence (Kreuter, 2007; 
Kopfman et al., 1998). However, a number of researchers have called for the examination of a 
combined effect (e.g., Allen & Preiss, 1997; Kreuter, 2007; Kopfman, 1998; Reynolds & 
Reynolds 2002).  Hornikx and Houët (2009) presented the results of one of the first studies to 
combine anecdotal and statistical evidence. Normatively strong anecdotal (narrative) evidence 
and normatively weak anecdotal evidence was presented to residents of a Dutch city in support 
of a proposed environmental regulation. In half of the cases, the narrative evidence (normatively 
weak or strong) was paired with statistical evidence. Results showed that persuasion only 
occurred when the narratives were combined with statistics (rather than with anecdotal evidence 
alone) and the persuasion was greater in the strong anecdotal + statistics situation than it was in 
the weak anecdotal + statistics situation.  Therefore, the results of this study suggest that in order 
for persuasion to occur, recipients needed some degree of statistical support.  However, the 
researchers did not test a statistics alone condition. Therefore, it is not clear if statistics acting 
alone would have been persuasive or if it was a combination of statistics with anecdotes that 
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created the persuasive effect.  In the end, researchers could only conclude that statistics should 
be combined with strong anecdotal evidence to be persuasive. 
Allen et al. (2000) also combined narrative and statistical evidence. Subjects received 
messages and then ranked the credibility of the speaker and their level of agreement with the 
messages conclusions. Fifteen different messages were presented and each message had four 
versions (i.e., 60 total messages). One version lacked any statistical or narrative evidence, one 
contained statistical evidence support only, one contained narrative evidence support only, and 
one contained both statistical and narrative support.  Each participant received one version of one 
message. This study found that messages combining narrative and statistical information were 
significantly more persuasive than those using narratives or statistics alone. The statistics only 
condition was the next highest in persuasiveness, then narrative only and lastly the no evidence 
condition. 
Allen et al. (2000) recognizes the need for an inclusive theory explaining theses results. 
“One issue still unresolved in the literature is the nature of cognitive processing that persons use 
that explains the findings. The conclusion is that statistical evidence is more persuasive than 
narrative proof but that the forms when combined are more effective. However, the conclusion 
offers little in the manner of explanation or understanding about why the particular effects are 
generated” (p. 335, italics mine).  
Rationale for Research Question  
Narrative evidence is suggested to be more persuasive than statistics because it is more 
naturally vivid (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sherer & Rogers, 1984), increases perceptions of 
representativeness (Hoeken, 2005; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975) and is easier to recall, especially 
after extended periods of time (Kazoleas, 1993). Additionally, narrative evidence produces more 
overall affective reactions (Kopfman et al., 1998) than statistics and increases absorption into the 
message (Stitt & Nabi, 2005). 
 Conversely, some researchers argue the statistical evidence is more persuasive than 
narratives because it is representative of a larger sample size (Hoeken, 2001a) and increases 
perceptions of believability and source credibility (Hornikx, 2008; Slater & Rouner, 1996). 
Moreover, statistical evidence tends to particularly outperform narrative evidence when working 
to support a general claim (Hoeken and Hustinx, 2006).  
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These findings suggest that narratives and statistics function to persuade in different 
ways. Absorption into narratives increases affective responses, reduces counterarguing (a sign of 
cognitive processing) and leads to more story-consistent beliefs (indicating persuasion).  
Alternatively, when looking at evidence for a more general claim, recipients are less likely to get 
connected and more apt to process cognitively rather than affectively. In these cases, the 
increased sample size and perceived believability of statistics garner superior persuasion. From 
this, this study offers two hypotheses. First, messages containing higher ratios of narrative 
evidence will be rated significantly higher in participants’ perceptions of narrative involvement 
than messages containing higher ratios of statistical evidence. Second, messages containing 
higher ratios of statistical evidence will be rated significantly higher in participants’ perception 
of message credibility than messages containing higher ratios of narrative evidence. Both 
hypotheses will be tested to determine if evidence types indeed function differently and thus 
create different perceptions for listeners.  
While numerous studies have called for it, little research has tested the effect of 
combining evidence types. However, an early study on combining narrative and statistical 
information (Allen et al., 2000) found a mixture of the two evidence types was more persuasive 
than statistics or anecdotes alone.  Moreover, Hornikx and Houët (2009) found that anecdotes are 
more persuasive when combined with statistics. Taken together, there is reason to suggest that 
evidence types have different, perhaps non-competing roles and recipients garner persuasive 
benefits from both evidence types (perhaps exponential benefits) when combined. This is helpful 
in gauging how communicators can utilize evidence to maximize persuasion. However, with 
both studies, there were limitations. The Allen team only tested an equal degree of statistics and 
anecdotes (50/50) and Hornikx and Houët combined a small amount of statistics with strong and 
weak anecdotes. 
Therefore, the next logical step is an examination of claims utilizing varying levels or 
ratios of narrative and statistical evidence. Maximum persuasion may exist with a particular 
combination of evidence support. Thus it makes sense to test different blends to see if a point of 
maximum persuasion truly exists. Given that both narratives and statistics are reported to be 
more persuasive than the other, and that a combination including both types produce the most 
persuasive outcome, a question of proportion comes to mind. In other words, what is the 
appropriate balance, and should it be even (as Allen et al. suggest) or should narrative be 
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weighted heavier (as Hornikx and Houët suggest). Therefore, the goal of this study is to test the 
persuasive effect of each evidence type as well as to extend what is known about combining both 
evidence types by testing different blends. Thus, to begin, this study will examine ratios of 
evidence at 100/0, 75/25, 50/50, 25/75 and 0/100 percent blends of narratives and statistics 
(respectively). This should indicate if particular blends are more effective when weighted heavier 
towards narratives or statistics. Are types of evidence equality important, or is one type more 
important? Given this uncertainty, the following research question will be pursued: 
RQ1: What is the most persuasive ratio of levels of narrative and statistical 
evidence? 
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CHAPTER 3 - Method 
Context 
Almost 97% of Americans consume meat (Staher, 2006). Yet, according to the United 
States Department of Agriculture, less than 2 percent of Americans are involved in the early 
stages of food production (i.e., farming or livestock production). Although it is likely that there is 
a small percentage of people not involved in farming or ranching who have some kind of 
understanding of production agriculture, it is more likely that most of the consumers know very 
little about the processes involved in the safety and welfare of food animals. Given the potential 
lack of knowledge about livestock production, messages from the beef industry may be helpful 
to these consumers regarding the food they are consuming.  
Online newspaper letters to the editor, drafted by a livestock producer, served as the 
messages for this study. These messages are of interest because the livestock industry relies on 
its communication messages to comfort and ultimately persuade its stakeholders (e.g., the meat 
consumers). The livestock industry wants to remind the consumer that it is acceptable to 
consume meat.  On the other hand, consumers want assurance that the processes involved with 
their food are at least safe and additionally humane. 
Sample 
The sample for this study involved a national sample of meat consumers. This study 
encompassed a total of 384 usable subjects. A large national sampling company, Survey 
Sampling International (SSI), was utilized to collect data. Collection was controlled to ensure 
equal representation across a number of important demographics.  An equal number of male and 
female respondents, as well as varied ethnicities were gathered to provide a respondent pool 
representative of the gender and ethnic backgrounds in the United States. Additionally, 
respondents were distributed across seven age groups (18-24, 25-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65, 66-75 
and 76+) with each age group accounting for between 11.1 and 18.3 percent of the responses. 
Income level was also controlled to ensure respondents were dispersed through the income 
makeup in the United States. Also of interest to this study was the geography of the respondents. 
Collection was controlled to provide at least 20 percent of the respondents in each category of 
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the three breakdowns of where people grew up - in a rural, suburban or urban environment. On 
top of this, the 20 percent minimum was also maintained for where the respondents live now - in 
a rural, suburban or urban environment. Geography could be significant because agriculture 
production tends to be a rural activity. A person’s opinions of the agriculture industry may vary 
based on their proximity to production agriculture, either in where they live now or their 
exposure growing up.  
The respondent pool was reduced to eliminate high issue involved subjects. Participants 
consisted of meat-eaters who reported they are not heavily involved in the livestock 
production/agriculture industry. Including people highly involved in livestock production would 
have run the risk of confounding the results. More specifically, it is likely this group already 
feels comfortable and will view any source of evidence for this message just as positively as any 
other source of evidence. Furthermore, vegans and vegetarians were excluded from the sample 
because they would be strongly predisposed to respond negatively to the message so no source of 
evidence would likely be viewed as any better than any other source of evidence.  To control for 
this, a couple of qualifying questions were included to account for issue involvement (i.e., the 
agriculture industry and non-meat eaters). Participants were asked (on a 10-point likert scale with 
10 being very familiar) how familiar or involved they are in the livestock/agriculture industry. 
Participants reporting 9 or 10 were removed from the analysis. Additionally, an eating habits 
question asked participants to classify themselves as a meat-eater, a vegetarian or a vegan. 
Participants who selected vegetarian or vegan for their eating habits were removed from the 
study. By eliminating high-involved and hostile subjects, it is less likely that issue involvement 
played a role in confounding the results of this experiment. 
Independent Variable 
Five different conditions served as the independent variable. Each condition represented a 
different degree, or blend, of narrative and statistical evidence. Each blend supported the same 
claim that “farmers and ranchers care about the welfare of their animals.” Participants were 
randomly assigned to a condition, and each condition received approximately the same number 
of participants. The following is the breakdown of the evidence blends and sample sizes of the 
five conditions.  
100% narrative, 0% statistics; n=75  
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75% narrative, 25% statistics; n=82  
50% narrative, 50% statistics; n=66  
25% narrative, 75% statistics; n= 85 
0% narrative, 100% statistics; n=76 
Stimulus Materials  
A letter to the editor served as the message framework, which remained consistent across 
all experimental trials. Letters contained the same general claims but differed in respect to the 
blend of evidence types they contained. Each letter included four pieces of evidence supporting 
the claim “farmers and ranchers care about the welfare of their animals.” See appendix G for the 
letter to the editor template. Evidence drawn from a pool of five pieces of statistical evidence and 
five pieces of narrative evidence. Evidence was randomly drawn from each pool (See appendices 
E and F). Below is a table indicating the number of narrative and statistical evidence pieces that 
were included in each of the blends.  
Table 3.1 Evidence Blends 
BLEND # OF NARRATIVE 
EVIDENCE PIECES 
# OF STATISTICAL 
EVIDENCE PIECES 
100% Narrative 4 0 
75% Narrative, 25% Statistics 3 1 
50% Narrative, 50% Statistics 2 2 
25% Narrative, 75% Statistics 1 3 
100% Statistics 0 4 
 
Once selected, evidence pieces were inserted into the letter to the editor framework (see 
appendix G). The order of the evidence within the letter to the editor was varied randomly to 
control for a potential primacy or recency ordering affects. 
Manipulation Check 
For the experiment to be considered convincing, and for the evidence to function as 
conceptualized in the literature, it was critical that the evidence included in the conditions were 
perceived as inherently statistical or narrative. To ensure that all statistical evidence was 
perceived as a statistic and that all narrative evidence was perceived as a narrative, and that the 
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statistics and the narratives were viewed as wholly different, several manipulation checks were 
performed prior to conducting the actual experiment.  
For the final manipulation check, 64 undergraduate students enrolled in public speaking 
classes at a Midwestern university read a total of twelve evidence pieces and responded to five 
seven-point semantic differential scales for each piece of evidence. Subjects rated all twelve 
evidence pieces using the same scales. Two of the scales were developed by the researcher to 
measure “statisticalness,” These items asked subjects to indicate on a seven-point scale if the 
evidence was “very scientific” to “not very scientific” as well as “based on numeric data” to “not 
based on numeric data.”  Three of the scales measured “narrativeness” and were based on a scale 
developed by Busselle and Bilandzic (2008). These items asked subjects to indicate on a seven 
point scales if they could “see this clearly in my mind” or “hear this clearly in my mind” and it 
“the setting clear in my mind.” Moreover, this check also indicated the two evidence types are 
different from one another as narrative evidence pieces were perceived as lower than statistical 
evidence in “scientificness” and “based on numeric data” but higher in the areas of “see clearly 
in my mind,” “hear clearly in my mind” and “the setting is clear in my mind.” Of the twelve 
initial evidence pieces, only 10 evidences pieces (5 of each) met the statistical and narrative 
criteria and were therefore selected for the study.  
Dependent Variables  
Source Credibility Scale. The credibility of the message source was measured using a 
6-item scale developed by Allen et al. (2000). The items asked participants to think about the 
extent to which they believed the letter writer was competent and trustworthy and then rate their 
responses using a 5-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree). The scale 
measured such as items as the reader finding the writer sincere, believable and dishonest. The 
credibility scale received a Cronbach's alpha reliability rating of .909 and a factor analysis 
revealed that all of the factors loaded on one component. 
Narrative Involvement.  Narrative Involvement was measured using a six-item scale 
utilized by Busselle and Bilandzic (2008). Narrative involvement is concerned with absorption or 
transportation into a message and “vicariously experiencing the characters’ emotions and 
personality,” (Slater & Rounder, 2002, p. 178, italics mine). The scale included measures such as 
the reader being pulled in to the message and rating that the reading experience was intense for 
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them. The narrative involvement scale received a Cornbach’s alpha reliability rating of .897 and 
a factor analysis revealed that all of the factors loaded on one component. 
Attitude Change Scale. Attitude change for the message, also referred to as persuasion, 
was measured using a slightly modified version of the 5-item scale developed by Allen et al. 
(2000). The scale asked participants to think about the extent to which they believed the letter 
conclusions and then rate their responses using a 5-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 
5=strongly agree). The scale contained questions about accepting the writer’s conclusion and if 
the reader’s opinion was consistent with the writer’s message. The attitude scale received a 
Cornbach’s alpha reliability rating of .889, and a factor analysis revealed that all of the factors 
loaded on one component.  
Procedure 
The survey company, SSI, contacted all of the participants and invited them to participate 
in this study.  In the message, participants were provided a link directing them to an online 
survey. The survey randomly assigned each participant to a condition that contained one of the 
five evidence blends.  Within each condition, a computer also randomly assigned evidence to the 
condition. For example, if Sue received the 50/50 condition, she might receive narrative evidence 
A and B as well as statistic evidence D and E. Similarly, if Joe received the 50/50 condition, he 
might receive narrative evidence B and E as well as statistic evidence A and C.    
Each participant read his or her message (containing a blend of evidence ranging from 
100% to 0% of each evidence type) in the form of a letter to the editor. Following the letter, 
participants completed three scales—the narrative involvement, the credibility and the attitude 
change (persuasion) scales. Once the collection numbers slowed to less than one a day, SSI 
closed the survey and sent the results to the researcher for analysis.  
Data Analysis 
SPSS was used to test both hypotheses and the research question. The results for the three 
dependent variables (credibility, narrative involvement and attitude) were tested separately using 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). ANOVA tests were run for statistically significant variance 
between the five-narrative/statistic blend groups for the variables of credibility, narrative 
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involvement and attitude. In addition to analyses of variance conducted, a series of post hoc tests 
were run to determine if differences existed among demographic variables of interest.  
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CHAPTER 4 - Results 
This study examined the effectiveness of narrative and statistical evidence in persuasion. 
Two hypotheses and one research question were presented in order to better understand how the 
two evidence types (narrative and statistic) separately and blended together at different levels 
affected (1) perceptions of narrative involvement, (2) perceptions of credibility and (3) overall 
persuasion.  
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that messages containing higher ratios of narrative evidence will 
be rated significantly higher in perceptions of narrative involvement with the message than 
messages containing higher ratios of statistical evidence. To test this hypothesis, an ANOVA 
between condition (different percentage blends of narratives and statistics) and narrative 
involvement was performed. The results did not yield a significant main effect for narrative 
involvement and the five conditions, F (4, 384) = .605, p = .659.   Despite the prediction that the 
conditions containing more narrative evidence would create more narrative involvement in the 
message, this effect did not occur. Therefore, hypothesis 1 was not supported, which suggests 
that participants were not any more involved in the narrative evidence than they were in the 
statistical evidence.  
Hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 2 posited that messages containing higher ratios of statistical evidence will be 
rated significantly higher in the participants’ perception of message credibility than messages 
containing higher ratios of narrative evidence. To test this hypothesis, an ANOVA analysis for 
variance between condition (different percentage blends of narratives and statistics) and 
credibility rating was performed. The results did not reveal a significant main effect for source 
credibility and the five conditions F (4, 384) = .861, p = .488. Hypothesis 2 was not supported, 
indicating that participants did not find that using statistical evidence to support animal welfare 
claims to be any more credible than using anecdotal support. However, an analysis of the means 
revealed that overall, participants rated the credibility of the source (livestock producer) quite 
high (M= 3.939).  
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Research Question 
The central research question of this study was interested in determining which evidence 
blend was the most persuasive.  Specifically, it asked, what is the most persuasive ratio of levels 
of narrative and statistical evidence?  To test this relationship an ANOVA was performed to test 
for differences between the condition (different percentage blends of narratives and statistics) 
and the attitude change (persuasion).  Results did not indicate a significant main effect F(4, 383) 
= .810, p =  .519. Thus, this study indicates there is no difference in persuasion for using 
completely narrative, completely statistical or blended version of these evidence types for animal 
welfare claims. Notably, the persuasive variance for each blend was so small, that it is fair to 
suggest Americans are not persuaded any more by statistics than they are by narratives, and that 
a blend of the two evidence types also did not create a greater degree of attitude change (100% 
Narrative, M = 4.01, SD = .809; 75% Narrative/25% Statistic, M = 3.88, SD = .926; 50% 
Narrative/50% Statistic, M = 3.81, SD = .90; 25% Narrative/75% Statistic, M = 3.78, SD = .905; 
100% Statistic, M = 3.91, SD = .789). 
Post Hoc Analysis 
Post hoc analyses were conducted to see if a relationship between persuasion and 
condition existed within particular demographics. To test for interactions, ANOVA analyses 
were performed to test for differences between the condition (different percentage blends of 
narratives and statistics), the demographic group (i.e., location, gender, age), and the attitude 
change (persuasion). Post hoc analyses were run for four different demographic variables – area 
of the country participant grew up, area of the country the participant lives now, gender and age.  
Although no formal hypotheses or research questions were offered in this area, it was of 
interest to determine if individual demographic differences influence the persuasive effectiveness 
of evidence blends. Results indicated that there was no significant main effect for the area the 
participant grew up and the persuasion F(2, 369) = .051, p = .950; nor was there a significant 
interaction effect for the area the participant grew up, condition and persuasion F(8, 369) = .920, 
p =. 500. No significant main effect was found for the area the participant lives now and 
persuasion F(2, 369) = 1.72, p =. 180; nor was there significance for where the participant lives 
now, condition, and persuasion F(8, 369) = .743, p = .653.  Similarly gender did not show any 
main [F(1, 374) = .087, p = .768], or interaction effects  [F(4, 374) = .461, p = .658].  Age, 
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however, did show a significant main effect for persuasion F(6, 349) = 3.98, p =. 001 with 
planned comparisons revealing that the 65 and order population is significantly easier to 
persuade with this topic (livestock welfare and safety) than the 35-45 age group. But, a 
significant interaction effect for age, condition and persuasion was not found F(24, 349) = .910, 
p =. 589 suggesting that evidence types did not create an influencing factor that impacted 
persuasion. Rather, age alone affects persuasion in this context matter. 
Summary of Findings 
This study revealed no significant difference for a participant’s narrative involvement 
with narrative versus statistical evidence. Participants became as involved in message supported 
completely by narrative as they did a message supported completely by statistics (as well as 
varying blends of the two). This study also suggests there is no significant difference in the 
perception of source credibility of a message differing in amounts of narrative and statistical 
evidence. These findings may suggest that evidence may not function as differently as some 
scholars have previously suggested in all contexts or channels. Moreover, persuasion difference 
is unaffected by altering the evidence types and ratios. Lastly, the results remain consistent 
across most demographics when it comes to the persuasion, evidence type or blend, and the 
variables of geography (grew up and live now), age or gender.  
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CHAPTER 5 -  Discussion 
 This study sought to determine if one kind of evidence was more persuasive than 
another. Up until this time, it was not clear if anecdotal evidence was superior to statistical 
evidence or vice versa. In fact, numerous studies support both sides. Theses studies discuss their 
findings by suggesting that the type of claim (e.g., general, specific, probability) or topic of 
persuasion (e.g., crime, internships, tanning) matter. Moreover, research in this area also reveals 
that statistics and anecdotes serve different functions in persuasive messages.  There is a degree 
of support for the combining of the evidence types to optimize persuasion. Nevertheless, any 
conclusive findings about which evidence to use, how much of each evidence type to use when 
blending evidence and even how the evidence types function, was still unclear. 
This study revealed that there is no difference in the persuasive ability of anecdotes 
versus statistics, and also no one particular blend (e.g., 75/25, 50/50, or 25/75) generates more 
persuasion. Moreover, it found that statistics and narratives might not function as differently as 
previous considered. This study found that statistics were not perceived as significantly more 
credible nor were anecdotes more effective at producing a significantly more narratively 
involved (or connected) participant.  
Methodologically, this study was extremely vigilant. It ran several manipulation checks 
to ensure the evidence included in the design was notably different. Ten different evidence 
pieces (5 of each) were rotated into the letter to comprise the appropriate blend of the condition 
each participant received as a guard against any one condition creating design effects. And the 
sample size neared 400 completed surveys from a national random sample of qualified 
participants (i.e., not vegan, not vegetarians, and not overly familiar with the livestock industry). 
And the results conclude: no significant effect in the types of evidence, the blends of types of 
evidence, or even the functions of the types of evidence.  Why? 
Theoretical Explanations & Implications  
It is possible that the topic of persuasion might be influencing the effects.  In the Baesler 
study (1997), he found that crime stories create a more polarizing difference in target’s minds as 
well as their reactions and perceptions to the claims. Although more research would be needed to 
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make solid conclusions, it is possible that participants already have an idea of what they believe 
about the topic of animal welfare and food safety—regardless of the type of support provided. In 
other words, predetermined dispositions may be influencing results and not message construction 
(Hornikx, 2008). 
It is also possible that the channel of the message may be influencing the results. There is 
reason to suggest that lean media (e.g., memos, letters, etc.) under the media richness model will 
not be as persuasively effective or produce as strong of difference between evidence types as a 
richer media (e.g., face-to-face, commercials, etc.) (Daft & Lengel, 1986). Factors that determine 
richness include (a) availability of instant feedback, (b) use of multiple verbal and nonverbal 
cues, (c) use of natural language and (d) the personal focus of the medium. Richer media allows 
for the ability to increase shared meaning. This may be particularly important when looking at 
narrative and statistical evidence as persuasion by narratives may depend on some degree of 
personal connectedness. It is much easier to feel connected to someone with a channel that 
allows for multiple cues than by reading a letter to the editor, even when the words written in the 
letter are the same as those spoken on television. The ability to see non-verbal communication 
cues and even interact creates a connected effect not possible with letters and memos. Years 
before Daft & Lengel’s theory of media richness, Borgodia and Nisbett (1977) discuss that 
channel mediums may matter and create different outcomes in persuasion.  They note how face-
to-face discussions about a teacher’s effectiveness were much more persuasive (especially with 
anecdotal evidence), than paper explanations of their effectiveness. Thus, the 100 percent 
narrative message and narrative heavy blends may have performed better in a richer medium, 
such as face-to-face communications.  
While it is possible this affected the results, it is more probable that the results indicate 
that both narrative and statistics are effective but for different reasons. Both the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM) explains this interpretation. ELM distinguishes between two routes of 
persuasion – the central route and the peripheral route. (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Central route 
processers require a great deal of thought and scrutinize messages. On the other hand, peripheral 
route processers tend to not cognitively break down messages and instead rely on peripheral 
cues, which are stimuli that can affect attitudes without processing the message. Examples of 
peripheral cues include perceived source attractiveness and credibility, number of arguments and 
message length. 
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One interpretation may be that the messages constructed in this study did not lead people 
to cognitively process or break down the messages. Not all persuasion is necessarily based on 
rigorous reasoning. People may have been just looking at whether there was evidence included in 
the message (and not necessary the quality of the evidence) to become persuaded. Thus, the 
results of the study could be explained by saying people peripherally processed the messages and 
were persuaded simply by the fact that evidence was present. However, it seems unlikely that all 
of the subjects peripheral processed the messages. First, the subjects were all meat eaters and the 
messages were about the way meat is produced in the America. This would give people 
motivation to break down the messages as they relate to the food they put in their bodies. 
Additionally, some people have an innate need for cognitive processing.  
While a variety of situational factors affect route selection, such as personal relevance of 
the message, there also is a chronic individual difference in route selection in a person’s innate 
need for cognition (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Simply put, some people have a higher need for 
high-level thinking and scrutinizing evidence than others. “Low need for cognition individuals 
are not characterized as unable to differentiate cogent from specious arguments, but rather they 
typically prefer to avoid the effortful, cognitive work required to derive their attitudes based on 
the merits of arguments presented” (Drolet, 2009, italics mine).  
Statistics withstand being broken down cognitively better than narratives as they by 
definition account for a larger sample size (Hoeken, 2001a). Thus, people with a high need for 
cognition would likely be more influenced by statistics. On the other hand, people with a low 
need for cognition are more likely rely on peripheral cues and fail to break down statistics. 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972,1973). This indicates that people with a low need for cognition 
would be less likely to be persuaded by statistics and would respond better to a narrative with 
strong peripheral cues. This is an important explanation with significant implications for 
practice. 
Simply put, it is not so much a difference in evidence types but a difference in people and 
how they respond to evidence types that determines whether or not messages are persuasive. 
People are diabolically different and while some gravitate toward persuasion by statistics, others 
are more moved by personal narratives.  
Practical Implications 
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While it is certainly interesting to learn that certain people prefer narratives while others 
prefer statistics and that there is no optimum blend of narratives and statistics for persuasion, this 
presents challenges from a practical standpoint. Until communicators have reliable information 
they are dealing with a sub population that consists of a common preference for either narratives 
or statistics, they will need to develop strategies that appeal to both groups. 
Generally, communicators do not have the luxury of knowing if their audience tends to 
prefer narratives or statistics. Usually communicators are trying to reach a broad audience. For 
example, in this context beef producers are attempting to reach a broad band of consumers with 
their message. No doubt, a group as wide-ranging as meat consumers will include both people 
who would prefer centrally processing and thus would be more susceptible to persuasion by 
statistics and others who would be more moved by peripherally processing a narrative. This 
study took an extra step to attempt to account for particular individual differences - information 
that could help in creating a tactical approach. However, breaking down groups by geography, 
gender and age still did not provide a homogeneous preference towards an evidence type. This 
indicates that absent of communicating with a highly specialized group (e.g., scientists), it is 
unlikely a target audience will share a common preference for either statistics or narratives.  So 
how do you reach a broad group with a variety of processing needs?   
One approach is mass communication messages to the masses. These messages will need 
to provide both narrative and statistical evidence to support the same claim in order to appeal to 
both preferences. If a communication message does not contain some degree of both narrative 
and statistical messages it is likely that communicators may only be successful at persuading (or 
reaching) half of the public.  
Additionally, further analysis of the results and recent research indicates communicators 
should consider their argument topic and communication channel when determining the amount 
of narrative and statistical evidence they chose to use. While both evidence types should be 
utilized regardless – it may be strategic to provide more of one evidence type in certain 
situations. When determining communication channels, rich channels should be utilized when 
possible.  And when rich channels are used, heavier anecdotal evidence will likely be more 
effective at connecting ideas with targets.  
One area for potential future research would be look for an interaction between channel 
type and the optimum blend for narratives and statistics for persuasion. Additionally, more 
 36 
research into need for cognition and factors determinative of a group’s need for cognition could 
help when looking to select evidence types. Finally, a follow up study look at relationship 
between central processing and different evidence types would be beneficial. 
 
Tactical Recommendations for the Beef Industry 
           The good news for the agriculture industry is that in general, the perceptions of credibility 
of the communicator—a livestock producer in this case—were quite high.  Because source 
credibility did not differ amongst the blends, this suggests that participants perceive livestock 
producers to be considerably component and trustworthy. This finding supports the trend we 
have already seen with people ranking farmers and ranchers as a good, credible source of 
information. (Delta Farm Press, 2004). 
So how can a producer take the findings of this study to deliver an effective persuasive 
message?  
The motivation for this study came from a reoccurring discussion at agriculture meetings. 
While many in the industry insisted communication to the public had to be fact laden and science 
based, others felt consumers really wanted to connect personally with producers and sharing 
personal stories (narratives) is the way to accomplish this. It is very likely that people within the 
agriculture industry are split in terms of what they personally find persuasive (narratives or 
statistics) just like the population at large and were advocating for the evidence type they 
personally prefer.  
This study shows that both groups are right. Some members of the public require science 
and facts in order to be persuaded. On the other hand, other people are more likely to accept 
positions supported by personal narratives. Thus, the agriculture industry must provide both 
narratives and statistics in order to effectively reach, and ultimately persuade, both subsets of the 
population.  
Beef advocates must be sufficiently familiar with the relevant statistics that support their 
claims. On top of this, beef advocates should undergo media training to become comfortable 
sharing these statistics as well as their personal stories. Livestock producers tend to be rugged 
individualists as well as humble by nature. This combination does not naturally lend itself 
towards self-promotion. In order to bridge this gap producers need to first become comfortable 
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promoting themselves and their industry and second learn how to reach out and connect with an 
urban consumer.  
Programs like National Cattlemen’s Beef Association’s (NCBA) Master’s of Beef 
Advocacy (MBA) program and the National Pork Producer Council’s (NPPC) Operation Main 
Street serve as great training tools to learn the relevant facts as well as tips for telling personal 
narratives. Agriculture advocates must take this training and implement its ideas – sharing both 
statistics and narratives that back up their messages. 
Additionally, advocates should utilize a variety of communication mediums – from 
printed letters to the editor and news media to the online environment and face-to-face 
communication – to disseminate their message. Multi-channel messaging combining traditional 
and new media is the most effective way to reach the greatest number of people (Kessler, 2006). 
Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign is recognized for its successful mobilization of new 
media and optimizing old, new, and different mediums to reach traditional and new audiences.  
The medium for the message in this study was a traditional letter to the editor. While this 
remains a viable output for advocacy, technology is changing the way the world communicates 
and other communication channels should also be utlized. Newspaper circulation has been on the 
decline since 1987 (Ahrens, 2009). Only 13 percent of Americans, or about 39 million people, 
now buy a daily newspaper, down from 31 percent in 1940. This decline can be attributed to a 
combination of less people reading the news daily and more people getting their news online 
(Pew, 2009). The Pew Research Center’s 2008 media consumption survey revealed a drop in the 
percentage of respondents reporting that they read the newspaper, either print or online, from 34 
percent to 25 percent. At the same time, people reporting they read an online newspaper 
yesterday grew from 9 percent to 14 percent.  
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Figure 5.1 Newspaper Readership 
 
Additionally, 73 percent of all online users say they come across news online when they 
have been on the web for another purpose (Pew, 2008). A vast majority of online news users 
younger than 25 (64%) say they more often follow links to news stories, rather than go directly 
to the homepages of news organizations themselves. Examples of places these links are 
commonly found include blogs, emails and social media sites.  
Use of social media sites like Facebook and Twitter is increasing quickly. According to 
The Nielsen Company, global consumers spent more than five and half hours on social 
networking sites like Facebook and Twitter in December 2009, an 82 percent increase from the 
same time last year when users were spending just over three hours on social networking sites 
(Nielson Wire, 2010).  
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Figure 5.2 Social Networking Site Traffic 
 
According to the Twitter Blog (2010), Twitter users were tweeting 5,000 times a day in 
2007.  By 2008, that number was 300,000, and by 2009 it had grown to 2.5 million per day. As 
of January 2010, the company is seeing 50 million tweets per day—that’s an average of 600 
tweets per second. And the counts do not include spam. 
 
Figure 5.3 Twitter Use 
 
 
In my personal experience, social networking advocacy works. The Humane Society of 
the United States is an organization that – despite its misleading name – does not operate any 
animal shelters or spay and neuter clinics but does spend a considerable amount of its time and 
money lobbying against animal agriculture. From time to time, I utilize my personal Facebook 
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page to share this with others. Below is a screen shot of an interaction where my friend Craig’s 
opinion of HSUS changed based on my Facebook advocacy. Craig is a law student specializing 
in administrative law with an interest in politics.  
 
Figure 5.4 HSUS Uncovered on Facebook 
 
 
I had a similar interaction recently with my friend Tina, a Wichita nurse.  
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Figure 5.5 HSUS Uncovered on Facebook No. 2 
 
Thus, social media should become an important channel for agriculture advocacy. 
Perhaps you found the statistics about social media persuasive in backing up this point. If not, 
then perhaps my personal experience was instrumental in garnering your support of the use of 
social media as a channel for agricultural advocacy. Or perhaps you are one of the unique dual 
processers who gained from both the statistics as well as my personal experience. The point is, 
most people tend to gravitate towards either statistics or narratives and had I included only one 
but not the other I would have missed out on the opportunity to meaningfully reach half of my 
audience.  
Bottom line, in order to effectively reach a broad public both statistics and narratives 
messages need to be utilized. This study provides reason to suggest no magic blend of the two 
exists to reach optimum persuasion, but rather both need to be tapped into in order to access the 
people who tend to be persuaded by statistics as well as those who are more susceptible to 
narrative persuasion.  
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Appendix A - Pre Test (Demographic Questions)  
Gender: M _____  F ______ 
 
Age:  18-24 ____  24-35 ____     36-45 ____     46-55 ____  56-65 ___    66-75 ___   76+ ___ 
 
Which best describes where you grew up: Rural ____ Suburban ____ Urban ____ 
 
Which best describes where you grew up: Rural ____ Suburban ____ Urban ____ 
 
Race:  
___ American Indian and Alaska Native 
___ Asian 
___ Black or African American 
___ Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander 
___ White 
___ American Indian and Alaska Native and White 
___ Asian and White 
___ Black or African American and White 
___ American Indian and Alaska Native and Black or African American 
___ Other/ Wish Not to Respond 
 
How familiar/connected are you with animal agriculture? 
Not          Very  
Familiar        Familiar  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Which best describes your eating habits? 
Vegan ___ Vegetarian ____ Meat Eater ___  
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Appendix B - Credibility Scale 
Rank your level of agreement with the following statements: 
 
1. The message is written by someone who knows the topic.  
Disagree   Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. The message is sincere.  
Disagree   Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. The message is believable.   
Disagree   Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. The message is dishonest.  
Disagree   Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. The message is trustworthy.  
Disagree   Agree  
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. The message is dynamic.  
Disagree   Agree  
  1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix C - Narrative Involvement Scale  
Rank your level of agreement with the following statements: 
 
1. I was mentally involved in the message while reading it. 
Disagree   Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. I was never really pulled into the message.  
Disagree   Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. While reading I was completely immersed in the message.   
Disagree   Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. Overall, the reading experience was intense for me.  
Disagree   Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. I wanted to learn how the message ended. 
Disagree   Agree  
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. While reading I wanted to know how the events would unfold. 
Disagree   Agree  
  1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix D - Persuasion Scale 
Rank your level of agreement with the following statements: 
 
1. I accept the conclusion of this message.  
Disagree   Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. I agree with the writer’s conclusion. 
Disagree   Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. I think the writer is wrong. 
Disagree   Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. My opinion is consistent with the writer’s message.  
Disagree   Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. I believe the message conclusion. 
Disagree   Agree  
  1 2 3 4 5  
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Appendix E - Narrative Evidence List  
A(N).	  After	  seeing	  a	  video	  of	  cattle	  being	  abused	  by	  sale	  barn	  employees,	  I	  was	  extremely	  angry	  with	  those	  workers.	  The	  way	  they	  treated	  the	  animals	  in	  the	  video	  was	  not	  appropriate	  and	  doesn’t	  reflect	  how	  I	  treat	  my	  animals	  at	  all.	  In	  response,	  I	  visited	  my	  local	  sale	  barn	  to	  talk	  with	  the	  employees	  and	  give	  them	  cattle	  care	  and	  handling	  training	  videos.	  After	  working	  with	  the	  sale	  barn	  workers	  I	  am	  certain	  they	  treat	  animals	  with	  care	  and	  respect	  just	  like	  I	  do.	  	   B(N).	  I	  have	  yearly	  meetings	  with	  my	  veterinarian,	  Steve,	  where	  I	  walk	  him	  through	  my	  barn	  and	  pastures	  and	  talk	  to	  him	  about	  my	  farm’s	  practices.	  Then,	  we	  sit	  down	  and	  amend	  the	  specific	  written	  protocols	  we’ve	  developed	  for	  my	  farm.	  For	  example,	  last	  year	  he	  noticed	  one	  of	  my	  heifer	  groups	  were	  a	  bit	  thinner	  than	  some	  of	  the	  others	  so	  we	  adjusted	  that	  group’s	  diet.	  These	  annual	  meetings	  ensure	  that	  I’m	  doing	  everything	  I	  can	  to	  best	  care	  for	  the	  well	  being	  of	  my	  animals.	  	  C(N).	  One	  of	  my	  favorite	  memories	  of	  growing	  up	  is	  riding	  with	  my	  dad	  and	  grandpa	  in	  my	  dad’s	  single	  cab,	  brown	  Ford	  pickup	  truck	  to	  go	  check	  cows	  in	  the	  field.	  Now,	  my	  two	  sons,	  Nathan	  and	  Riley,	  ride	  with	  me	  to	  check	  cows	  in	  those	  same	  pastures	  and	  that	  same	  truck.	  Riley	  told	  me	  the	  other	  day	  that	  when	  he’s	  a	  dad	  he	  wants	  to	  do	  the	  same	  thing	  with	  his	  son.	  Because	  I	  want	  my	  sons	  to	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  make	  a	  living	  on	  our	  family’s	  ranch,	  I	  treat	  my	  land	  and	  animals	  with	  only	  the	  greatest	  care	  and	  respect	  every	  day.	  	  D(N).	  I	  was	  talking	  to	  a	  mom	  in	  front	  of	  the	  meat	  case	  at	  the	  grocery	  store	  the	  other	  day.	  She	  mentioned	  to	  me	  that	  she	  was	  worried	  about	  the	  safety	  of	  feeding	  her	  family	  beef.	  I	  told	  her	  that	  as	  a	  father,	  I	  worry	  about	  the	  health	  and	  safety	  of	  my	  children	  too,	  but	  I	  don’t	  worry	  about	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  beef	  I	  feed	  them.	  I	  know	  the	  beef	  I	  produce	  is	  safe	  and	  wholesome.	  In	  fact,	  I’m	  so	  confident	  about	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  product,	  the	  beef	  we	  send	  to	  the	  grocery	  store	  is	  the	  same	  I	  feed	  my	  family.	  	  The	  mom	  I	  spoke	  with	  ended	  up	  buying	  flat	  iron	  steaks	  to	  feed	  her	  family	  that	  night.	  	   	  E(N).	  I	  care	  about	  my	  animals	  not	  only	  because	  it’s	  how	  I	  make	  a	  living,	  but	  also	  because	  it’s	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do.	  Last	  winter	  one	  of	  the	  cows	  calved	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  night	  during	  a	  fierce	  snowstorm.	  My	  family	  brought	  the	  calf	  into	  the	  kitchen	  of	  our	  home	  and	  warmed	  it	  up	  by	  rubbing	  it	  with	  towels.	  	  We	  wanted	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  calf	  had	  a	  safe,	  warm	  start	  to	  its	  life.	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Appendix F - Statistical Evidence List 
A(S). Undercover videos of animal abuse in sale barns are not the industry norm. To date, 
the industry has distributed more than 2,000 cattle care and handling training videos to 
the nation’s 1,250 livestock markets and other cattle sales locations. 
 
B(S). More than 90 percent of cattle in the U.S. are handled by practices influenced by 
the voluntary, industry-driven Beef Quality Assurance (BQA) program. This program 
works to prevent disease, establish written protocols and establish valid veterinarian 
client-patient relationships. 
 
C(S). Beef producers love their animals and lifestyle. In a survey conducted by the Iowa 
Beef Center, 60 percent of producers indicated they intended to pass their operation on to 
their children. 
 
D(S). Beef producers have invested 27 million dollars in beef safety research through the 
beef checkoff since 1993 and, collectively, the industry continues to invest $350 million 
each year in safety research, technology and practices. 
 
E(S). Beef produced in the U.S. is safe and wholesome. The incidence of E. coli 
O157:H7 in ground beef declined more than 80 percent between 2000 and 2006, 
according to USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). 
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Appendix G - Letter to the Editor Template 
Dear Editor,  
 I’m writing in response to a recent story published in your paper talking about the need 
for additional regulation on animal agriculture. I’m a third generation beef producer and took 
offense to the article. My fellow cattle growers and myself care greatly about the welfare of our 
animals and produce a safe, wholesome product.  
 Insert evidence 1. Additionally, insert evidence 2.  
On top of this, insert evidence 3. Finally, insert evidence 4.  
Thank you for your time and attention to this letter. It’s important that people realize how 
much beef producers really do care about their cattle and producing a safe product for Americans 
and consumers around the world.  
Sincerely, 
James Rolland  
 56 
Appendix H - Sample Letter to the Editors 
a. Sample Letter to the Editor  - 100 % Narrative  
Dear Editor,  
 I’m writing in response to a recent story published in your paper talking about the need 
for additional regulation on animal agriculture. I’m a third generation beef producer and took 
offense to the article. My fellow cattle growers and myself care greatly about the welfare of our 
animals and produce a safe, wholesome product.  
 I love my animals and the rural lifestyle I live. It’s s legacy I hope to be able to pass on to 
my own sons, Nathan and Riley, when they are old enough to take over our family’s ranch. 
Additionally, I’ve worked hand in hand with my local sale barn, providing them cattle care and 
handling training videos. Undercover videos of animal abuse in sale barns are not the industry 
norm. I know the employees at my sale barn well and see that they treat animals with care and 
respect. 
On top of this, every time one of my fellow producers or I sell a head of cattle, we 
contribute $1 to the beef checkoff, which invests in beef safety research. For example, checkoff 
research led to new protocols in packing plants that help reduce pathogens.. Finally, the beef I 
produce is safe and wholesome. I have never had a problem with E. coli in my livestock and 
neither has any producer I know. In fact, I’m so sure of my product’s safety, the beef we send to 
the grocery store is the same meat I feed my family.  
Thank you for your time and attention to this letter. It’s important that people realize how 
much beef producers really do care about their cattle and producing a safe product for Americans 
and consumers around the world.  
Sincerely, 
James Rolland  
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b. Sample Letter to the Editor 75% Narrative 25% Statistics   
Dear Editor,  
 I’m writing in response to a recent story published in your paper talking about the need 
for additional regulation on animal agriculture. I’m a third generation beef producer and took 
offense to the article. My fellow cattle growers and myself care greatly about the welfare of our 
animals and produce a safe, wholesome product.  
 I care about my animals not only because it’s how I make a living, but also because it’s 
the right thing to do. Last winter one of the cows calved in the middle of the night during a fierce 
snowstorm. My family brought the calf into the kitchen of our home and warmed it up by 
rubbing it with towels.  We wanted to make sure that calf had a safe, warm start to its life. 
Additionally, after seeing a video of cattle being abused by sale barn employees, I was extremely 
angry with those workers. The way they treated the animals in the video was not appropriate and 
doesn’t reflect how I treat my animals at all. In response, I visited my local sale barn to talk with 
the employees and give them cattle care and handling training videos. After working with the 
sale barn workers I am certain they treat animals with care and respect just like I do. 
On top of this, I was talking to a mom in front of the meat case at the grocery store the 
other day. She mentioned to me that she was worried about the safety of feeding her family beef. 
I told her that as a father, I worry about the health and safety of my children too, but I don’t 
worry about the safety of the beef I feed them. I know the beef I produce is safe and wholesome. 
In fact, I’m so confident about the safety of the product, the beef we send to the grocery store is 
the same I feed my family.  The mom I spoke with ended up buying flat iron steaks to feed her 
family that night. Finally, more than 90 percent of cattle in the U.S. are handled by practices 
influenced by the voluntary, industry-driven Beef Quality Assurance (BQA) program. This 
program works to prevent disease, establish written protocols and establish valid veterinarian 
client-patient relationships. 
Thank you for your time and attention to this letter. It’s important that people realize how 
much beef producers really do care about their cattle and producing a safe product for Americans 
and consumers around the world.  
Sincerely, 
James Rolland  
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c. Sample Letter to the Editor 50% Narrative 50% Statistics   
Dear Editor,  
 I’m writing in response to a recent story published in your paper talking about the need 
for additional regulation on animal agriculture. I’m a third generation beef producer and took 
offense to the article. My fellow cattle growers and myself care greatly about the welfare of our 
animals and produce a safe, wholesome product.  
I love my animals and the rural lifestyle I live. It’s a legacy I hope to be able to pass on to 
my own sons, Nathan and Riley, when they are old enough to take over our family’s ranch. 
Additionally, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS) implements a series of safeguards to protect against foodborne disease and illness. 
Veterinary inspectors check all livestock visually before slaughter, examining more than 100 
million food animals each year. 
On top of this, more than 90 percent of cattle in the U.S. are handled by practices 
influenced by the voluntary, industry-driven Beef Quality Assurance (BQA) program. This 
program works to prevent disease, establish written protocols and establish valid veterinarian 
client-patent relationships. Finally, when I sell cattle for beef, each and every one of them is 
inspected by a veterinarian before slaughter as a safeguard against harvesting cattle that could 
present disease or illness issues. 
Thank you for your time and attention to this letter. It’s important that people realize how 
much beef producers really do care about their cattle and producing a safe product for Americans 
and consumers around the world.  
Sincerely, 
James Rolland  
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d. Sample Letter to the Editor 25% Narrative 75% Statistics   
Dear Editor,  
 I’m writing in response to a recent story published in your paper talking about the need 
for additional regulation on animal agriculture. I’m a third generation beef producer and took 
offense to the article. My fellow cattle growers and myself care greatly about the welfare of our 
animals and produce a safe, wholesome product.  
More than 90 percent of cattle in the U.S. are handled by practices influenced by the 
voluntary, industry-driven Beef Quality Assurance (BQA) program. This program works to 
prevent disease, establish written protocols and establish valid veterinarian client-patient 
relationships. Additionally, one of my favorite memories of growing up is riding with my dad 
and grandpa in my dad’s single cab, brown Ford pickup truck to go check cows in the field. 
Now, my two sons, Nathan and Riley, ride with me to check cows in those same pastures and 
that same truck. Riley told me the other day that when he’s a dad he wants to do the same thing 
with his son. Because I want my sons to have the opportunity to make a living on our family’s 
ranch, I treat my land and animals with only the greatest care and respect every day. 
On top of this, beef produced in the U.S. is safe and wholesome. The incidence of E. coli 
O157:H7 in ground beef declined more than 80 percent between 2000 and 2006, according to 
USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). Finally, beef producers have invested 27 
million dollars in beef safety research through the beef checkoff since 1993 and, collectively, the 
industry continues to invest $350 million each year in safety research, technology and practices. 
Thank you for your time and attention to this letter. It’s important that people realize how 
much beef producers really do care about their cattle and producing a safe product for Americans 
and consumers around the world.  
Sincerely, 
James Rolland  
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e. Sample Letter to the Editor 100% Statistics   
Dear Editor,  
  I’m writing in response to a recent story published in your paper talking about the need 
for additional regulation on animal agriculture. I’m a third generation beef producer and took 
offense to the article. My fellow cattle growers and myself care greatly about the welfare of our 
animals and produce a safe, wholesome product.  
 More than 90 percent of cattle in the U.S. are handled by practices influenced by the 
voluntary, industry-driven Beef Quality Assurance (BQA) program. This program works to 
prevent disease, establish written protocols and establish valid veterinarian client-patent 
relationships. Additionally, undercover videos of animal abuse in sale barns are not the industry 
norm. To date, the industry has distributed more than 2,000 cattle care and handling training 
videos to the nation’s 1,250 livestock markets and other cattle sales locations. 
On top of this, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS) implements a series of safeguards to protect against foodborne disease and 
illness. Veterinary inspectors check all livestock visually before slaughter, examining more than 
100 million food animals each year. Finally, beef produced in the U.S. is safe and wholesome. 
The incidence of E. coli O157:H7 in ground beef declined more than 80 percent between 2000 
and 2006, according to USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS).  
Thank you for your time and attention to this letter. It’s important that people realize how 
much beef producers really do care about their cattle and producing a safe product for Americans 
and consumers around the world.  
Sincerely, 
James Rolland  
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Appendix I - Manipulation Check Scale 
Please rank the evidence you just read on the following scales.  
 
The message is very scientific _ _ _ _ _ _ _ The message is not very scientific 
 
I can see this clearly in my mind  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  I cannot see this clearly in my mind  
 
The message is based on   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ This message is not based on       
        numeric data       numeric data. 
 
I can hear this clearly in my mind  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I cannot hear this clearly in my mind  
 
The setting is clear in my mind  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ The setting is not clear in my mind 
 
 
 
